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AFTER OBERGEFELL: DIGNITY FOR THE SECOND AMENDMENT
Marc A. Greendorfer*
I. INTRODUCTION

On June 26, 2015, a sharply divided United States Supreme Court issued its
ruling in Obergefell v. Hodges,I commonly known as the "same-sex marriage"
case. Writing for the majority opinion, Justice Anthony Kennedy introduced the
rationale for striking down state laws that did not recognize a right to same-sex
marriage: a theretofore unrecognized and unenumerated "dignity" right that took
legal precedence over longstanding principles of federalism and the bedrock
American legal tradition of allowing states to experiment with solutions to a
wide range of social issues.
Justice Kennedy did not explicitly consign federalism to the ash heap of
history, but to put the Court's ruling into effect (that is, to force each of the 50
states to recognize a right to same-sex marriage), the basic premise of
federalism-that each state has the right to make its own laws, other than to the
extent there is federal preemption for a limited universe of topics-has to be
disemboweled. This description of the fate of federalism is particularly true in
light of the fact that prior to Obergefell, there was no question that the regulation
2
of marriage was a matter strictly consigned to state control.

* Copyright V 2015 by Marc A. Greendorfer. Marc Greendorfer received his Bachelor of Arts degree
from the University of California, Davis in 1986. He received his Juris Doctorate from Benjamin N. Cardozo
School of Law in 1996 and is admitted to practice in California and New York and before the United States
Supreme Court. He graduated magna cum laude and served as Articles Editor-Submissions of the Cardozo
Law Review from 1995 to 1996. After working at AmLaw 100 law firms in New York and San Francisco for
more than a decade, Mr. Greendorfer founded Tri Valley Law in 2008, where he is currently a partner. In
2015, Mr. Greendorfer founded Zachor Legal Institute to further his legal advocacy work. Mr. Greendorfer's
other scholarly papers, including versions of his Supreme Court briefs, are available at
http://ssrn.com/author=2133013 and the work of Zachor Legal Institute can be followed through its website,
www.zachorlegal.org.
The author dedicates this article to the memory of Justice Antonin Scalia. Justice Scalia's dissent in Obergefell
v. Hodges , one of his last published opinions, was the inspiration for this article. A short time before his death,
Justice Scalia joined Justice Clarence Thomas in dissenting to a denial of certiorari in Friedman v. City of

Highland Park, Illinois., 784 F.3d 406 ( 7 th Cir. 2015), cert denied, 136 S. Ct. 447, 449 (2015) (577 U.S.
(2015)), a case dealing with the status of Second Amendment rights. In their dissent, Justices Scalia and
Thomas excoriated lower courts for undermining the robust Second Amendment rights that were set forth in
Justice Scalia's opinion in District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008), and urged the Supreme Court to
take action to implement the protections afforded by Heller. It is the author's hope that this article will be used
to effect what Justice Scalia called for in Friedman:ending the second class treatment of the rights protected by
the Second Amendment and restoring them to the sacrosanct status of all other fundamental rights. Requiem
aeternam dona ei, Domine, et lux perpetua luceat ei. Requiescatin pace, Nino. Amen.

1. 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
2. While some would argue that U.S. v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013), is an example of the Court
finding that the federal government had the power to regulate marriage, the opposite is the case. In Windsor,
the Court ruled that the federal government could not deny federal benefits available only to married persons in
a situation where a state already recognized same-sex marriage. The Windsor Court explicitly affirmed that its
decision was based on the fact that states are the sole arbiter of marriage recognition and federalism required
the federal government to provide benefits in accord with the definition of marriage adopted by the state in
which the parties were married.
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What does Obergefell mean for other state and local laws that purport to
regulate other matters that have been found to be protected by the Constitution?
In particular, can any state laws that regulate the right to keep and bear arms, a
right protected by the Second Amendment, survive in a post-Obergefell world?
II. THE OBERGEFELL RULING

A. Before Obergefell-Regulationof Marriageas the Exclusive Province of the
States
Prior to the Obergefell ruling, a supermajority of the 50 states did not issue
marriage licenses to same-sex couples. 3 Indeed, at that point, only three states
had affirmatively acted through a direct vote of their citizens to authorize the
issuance of marriage licenses to same-sex couples. 4 In U.S. v. Windsor, a case
decided a mere two years before Obergefell, Justice Kennedy wrote for the
majority and acknowledged that "the Federal Government, through our history,
has deferred to state-law policy decisions with respect to domestic relations" and
went so far as to affirm that "[t]he definition of marriage is the foundation of the
State's broader authority to regulate the subject of domestic relations" and
"regulation of domestic relations is an area that has long been regarded as a
virtually exclusive province of the States." 5
While the Windsor court noted that the right of states to define marriage
was subject to certain overriding protections that the Constitution provided for
individual rights, it declined to find that same-sex marriage was such a protected
right. 6 Instead, the Windsor Court chose to make a ruling that respected and
affirmed federalism and the sovereign right of states to regulate marriage. This
is shown both in the majority opinion, where Justice Kennedy excoriated
Congress for trying to use federal law regulating marriage benefits as a way to
"influence or interfere with state sovereign choices about who may be married," 7
and in Justice Roberts' dissent, where he took pains to remind us that the
majority's opinion was "based on federalism." 8
3. Brief of Tri Valley Law, infra note 29, at 7-8 (amicus brief in Obergefell arguing, inter alia, that the
Court should not find a fundamental right to exist where voters in 30 of the 50 states had rejected same-sex
marriage). In some of the 30 states, courts subsequently overruled the voter/legislator enacted prohibitions.
For purposes of federalism, however, the acts of the citizens of the states and their representatives, rather than
the acts of the judiciary, are what count.
4. Id. at 8. For purposes of this paper, I will use the phrases "recognizing same sex marriage" and
"authorizing the issuance of marriage licenses to same sex couples" interchangeably. There is obviously a
substantive difference between a state issuing a marriage license and a state recognizing a marriage, but a
discussion of the differences is outside the scope of this paper.
5. Windsor, supra note 2, at 2691 (emphasis added).
6. Id. at 2697 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) ("We may in the future have to resolve challenges to state
marriage definitions affecting same-sex couples. That issue, however, is not before us in this case . . . . I write
only to highlight the limits of the majority's holding and reasoning today, lest its opinion be taken to resolve not
only a question that I believe is not properly before us-DOMA's constitutionality but also a question that all
agree, and the Court explicitly acknowledges, is not at issue.").

7. Id. at 2693.
8. Id. at 2697 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). See also, Justice Scalia's separate dissent, where he decries
the "rootless and shifting" nature of the majority opinion, which Scalia said frequently invoked principles of
federalism and the exclusive power of states to regulate marriage while, at the same time, disclaiming reliance
upon those very principles. Id. at 2705 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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B. Justice Kennedy's Majority Opinion in Obergefell: the Death ofFederalism
Two years after Windsor's affirmation of the inherent right of states to
regulate marriage, in Obergefell, Justice Kennedy did an about-face on
federalism and blithely terminated states' rights in one of the more convoluted
and conclusory opinions in the history of the Supreme Court. Reciting, ad
nauseam, the uncontradicted and irrelevant (for purposes of the questions asked)
constitutional principle of a fundamental right to traditional (that is, oppositesex) marriage, Justice Kennedy effectively ignored the legal issues surrounding
the relevant question of whether the union of a same-sex couple has the same
legal status of traditional marriage for purposes of rights protected by the
Constitution.9 Justice Kennedy acknowledged that historically, marriage has
referred exclusively to the union of opposite-sex couples.1 0 Justice Kennedy
further recognized, as he did in Windsor, that states have traditionally and
exclusively defined marriage.11 Moreover, Justice Kennedy noted that some
states had changed their laws to recognize same-sex marriage (while
conveniently ignoring the fact that most states had chosen to not do so) and that
the "democratic" process was still unfolding with regard to changing the
definition of marriage in various states.12
As a legal matter, this should have been the end of the discussion.
Rather than follow precedent and established principles of federalism,
Justice Kennedy veered into a "better-informed-than-thou" tangent to conclude
that the people's judgment in the supermajority of states that had not recognized
same-sex marriage through democratic processes was faulty and, pursuant to the
superior moral judgment of the five Justices making up the Court's majority, the
fundamental right of marriage should encompass same-sex couples as well, to
protect the previously unrecognized fundamental dignity rights of everyone other
than opposite sex couples.13
What is telling about the extreme nature of this ruling can be shown through
two facts of note. First, there was not a single concurring opinion. Second,
Justice Kennedy could cite no authority for the principle that the Supreme Court
has the power to create new, amorphous fundamental rights in contravention of
the clear, democratically expressed will of the people in a supermajority of states
in the union.1 4 In fact, as Chief Justice Roberts observed, Justice Kennedy had
to implicitly overrule binding 14h Amendment precedent to reach his desired
result in Obergefell. 15
9. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2628 (2015) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("But the Court ends this
debate, in an opinion lacking even a thin veneer of law.").
10. Id. at 2598 ("It cannot be denied that this Court's cases describing the right to marry presumed a
relationship involving opposite-sex partners.").
11. Id. at 2628 (Scalia, J. dissenting) (citing to Justice Kennedy's opinion in United States v. Windsor,

133 S. Ct. 2675, 2691(2013)).
12. Id. at 2605.
13. Id. at 2598-2608.
14. Brief of Tri Valley Law, infra note 29, at 8 ("voters in 30 of the 50 states have affirmatively rejected
the licensing of same sex marriage. This isn't just majoritarianism, it is supermajoritarianism.").

15. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2620-21 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) ("Perhaps recognizing how little
support it can derive from precedent, the majority goes out of its way to jettison the "careful" approach to
implied fundamental rights taken by this Court in Glucksberg. It is revealing that the majority's position
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In a case representing one of the broadest expansions of the legal rights of
homosexual persons, there is much to be seen in the refusal of even one of the
liberal, activist Justices to file a concurring opinion.
In his majority opinion, Justice Kennedy cited directly to Loving v.
Virginial6 eight separate times, Zablocki v. Redhail1 7 ten separate times, and
Lawrence v. Texasl 8 twelve separate times. Though Chief Justice Roberts and
Justice Scalia each deftly dispatched Justice Kennedy's contortion of the
holdings in these three cases as being without any legal basis, the concurring
opinions in these three cases demonstrate something quite illustrative about the
absence of concurring opinions in Obergefell. In Loving, a unanimous Court
struck down anti-miscegenation statutes, yet even with unanimity, Justice Potter
Stewart filed a concurring opinion to reiterate the unconstitutional nature of any

law that discriminated based on race. 19 In Zablocki, where, like Obergefell, only
five justices constituted the majority for a deeply divided Court, there were four
concurring opinions (and one dissenting opinion). 20 In Lawrence, where six
justices found that anti-sodomy statutes effected an unconstitutional
discrimination against same-sex couples, Justice Sandra O'Connor filed a
concurring opinion to support the effect of the majority's ruling. 2 1
While a concurring or dissenting opinion is not precedential, nor is it
binding, it serves as persuasive authority that can be used by future courts to
properly deal with questions unanswered from the original opinion, especially in
cases, like Obergefell, where the point of law has no other binding precedent. 22
Furthermore, as none other than Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg wrote in 2010,
there are several layers of demonstrated utility in dissenting (and, by extension,
concurring) opinions. First, concurring and dissenting opinions are used
internally at the Court to "lead the author of the majority opinion to refine and
clarify" that opinion. 23
Second, concurring and dissenting opinions are
published by the Court's justices to "appeal to the intelligence of a future day"
so that a case that was decided on a precarious legal foundation can be corrected
by future decisions. 24

requires it to effectively overrule Glucksberg, the leading modern case setting the bounds of substantive due
process.").
16. 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (finding state level bans on interracial marriages to be violative of the
Amendment's Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses).

14 th

17. 434 U.S. 374 (1978) (finding state level regulations that required a non-custodial parent to pay child
support in arrears prior to being issued a marriage license to be violative of the 1 4 th Amendment's Equal
Protection Clause).
18. 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (finding anti-sodomy laws to violate the 14th Amendment's Due Process
Clause).
19. Loving, 388 U.S. at 13 (Stewart, J. concurring).

20. Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 391 (Burger, C.J., concurring), 392 (Stewart, J., concurring), 396 (Powell, J.,
concurring), 403 (Stevens, J., concurring), and 407 (Rhenquist, J., dissenting).
21. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 579 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
22. See generally Chad Flanders, Toward a Theory of Persuasive Authority, 62 OKLA. L. REV. 55

(2009).
23. Ruth Bader Ginsburg, The Role ofDissentingOpinions, 95 MINN. L. REV. 1, 3 (2010).
24. Id. at 4. Tellingly, Justice Ginsburg cites the dissents of Justices Stevens and Breyer in District of
Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008), as examples of persuasive authority that serve as "intelligence for a
future day."
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How can it be that Justice Kennedy relied upon three cases as support for
his redefinition of the fundamental right to marriage, an act that is as
revolutionary as it is unprecedented, three cases where even when there was
unanimity at least one justice spoke through a concurring opinion to emphasize
the justification for the rulings, yet not one of the most activist justices in the
Court's history could write a single word of support for Justice Kennedy's
opinion?
As the Obergefell dissenting opinions note, emphatically, Justice
Kennedy's majority opinion was a rambling morass, representing an "act of will,
not legal judgment" with "no basis in the Constitution or this Court's
precedent" 25 and "indefensible as a matter of constitutional law." 2 6 Justice
Scalia observed that the majority opinion was "incoherent" and went on to
analyze the opinion as being "couched in a style that is as pretentious as its
content is egotistic. It is one thing for separate concurring or dissenting opinions
to contain extravagances, even silly extravagances, of thought and expression; it
is something else for the official opinion of the Court to do so." 27
Why did not one of the more outspoken liberal justices take pen to hand to
defend his or her support for a decision that was described by other justices as, in
effect, lawless and incoherent? If there are to be limits to the newly created legal
system in which the democratic process of discerning fundamental rights has
been superseded by judicial fiat, shouldn't at least one of the concurring justices
have provided the contours of any limitations (or affirmation of the breadth) on
the power of the Court to sweep aside the democratic process?
The obvious answer is that the majority's decision was indeed lawless, and
that any attempt to bolster or defend it would have simply exposed the fact that it
was incoherent as a legal opinion and simply a matter of the judiciary assuming
the powers of the legislative branch. Even with Chief Justice Roberts begging
for a concurring opinion that could explain the legal basis for the majority's
decision, and Justice Scalia taunting the majority to provide such an opinion, the
majority fell silent. We are left with no choice but to conclude that the
elimination of the democratic process in shaping fundamental rights is as all
encompassing and groundless as the dissenting opinions describe.
That is a reflection of the fact that Justice Kennedy could cite to no
precedent for his opinion. Though Justice Kennedy's opinion was littered with
references to other Supreme Court cases on traditional marriage and homosexual
rights, none of those cases provided legal support for the Court's decision in
Obergefell. Chief Justice Roberts, Justice Scalia, and Justice Thomas expressed
disbelief that after all of the marriage case dicta in Justice Kennedy's decision,
he ended up redefining marriage to include same-sex couplings based purely on
his claim that the Supreme Court trumps the will and voice of the people and the
states due to the Court's "better informed understanding of how constitutional
imperatives define . . . liberty." 28 This type of baseless, conclusory legal

25. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2612 (2015) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
26. Id. at 2616.
27. Id. at 2630. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
28. Id. at 2637 (Thomas, J., dissenting). See also, id. at 2621 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) ("To be fair,
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reasoning is the type of work usually found in a coffeehouse packed with firstyear law students grappling with initial drafts of moot court briefs.
What should be taken from this is that the majority's Obergefell opinion
creates a new, broad right that is seemingly without limitation. The silence of
concurring justices leaves us with only the dissenting opinions as intelligence for
a future day with which we can discern the contours of the interplay between
fundamental rights and state regulations that affect those rights. This is the role
of persuasive authority when the majority opinion contains ambiguous legal
reasoning on a point of law that has no other precedent.
As in nature, where birth and death are interrelated, in this case, the birth of
a new and amorphous fundamental right to same-sex marriage was possible only
as a consequence of the Court thrusting a judicial dagger into the heart of
federalism. If an unenumerated and previously unrecognized right can be used
to suppress traditional rights of the states, how can any state regulation of
fundamental rights, especially constitutionally enumerated fundamental rights,
be allowed to stand?
III. OBERGEFELL AND THE FUTURE OF STATES' RIGHTS

In the amicus curiae brief I filed in support of the respondents in
Obergefell, I cautioned the Court of the unintended consequences of a decision
that broadly undermined federalism. Specifically, I asked the Court to consider
the following point, assuming that the Court would create a new fundamental
right to same-sex marriage:
This Court will be in a position of having to explain how voter
approved state prohibitions on one unenumerated, unrecognized
right (same-sex marriage) constitute a violation of the Due
Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth
Amendment, yet enumerated [c]onstitutional rights are not
befitting the same protections and, in fact, state or local
regulations on such rights can be so pervasive as to prohibit the
right from being exercised in a meaningful way. The most
obvious example is the Second Amendment right to keep and
bear arms. One day, this Court will have to explain how
sweeping restrictions on every aspect of firearms ownership and
use can be upheld yet traditional and long-standing regulations
on marriage cannot be tolerated in any form or in any
the majority does not suggest that its individual autonomy right is entirely unconstrained. The constraints it
sets are precisely those that accord with its own "reasoned judgment," informed by its 'new insight' into the
'nature of injustice,' which was invisible to all who came before but has become clear 'as we learn [the]
meaning' of liberty. The truth is that today's decision rests on nothing more than the majority's own
conviction that same-sex couples should be allowed to marry because they want to, and that 'it would disparage
their choices and diminish their personhood to deny them this right.' Whatever force that belief may have as a
matter of moral philosophy, it has no more basis in the Constitution than did the naked policy preferences
adopted in Lochner.") and id. at 2630 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("Rights, we are told, can 'rise ... from a better
informed understanding of how constitutional imperatives define a liberty that remains urgent in our own era.'
(Huh? How can a better informed understanding of how constitutional imperatives [whatever that means]
define [whatever that means] an urgent liberty [never mind], give birth to a right?)").
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jurisdiction. In the wake of this Court's decision in District of
Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008) (finding an individual
right to keep and bear arms), a number of state and local
governments imposed draconian restrictions on firearms,
claiming that the restrictions were reasonable and common sense
and did not infringe the core right protected by the Second
Amendment . . . . Much of the justification for recognizing a
right to same sex marriage in the instant case rests on the claim
that same sex couples have children that are harmed by the
denial of marriage licenses. If this Court rules in favor of
Petitioners, will it subsequently allow "reasonable, common
sense" regulation of same-sex marriage that restricts it to only
those same-sex couples that have children, since the core right
protected by the decision in this case revolves around children?
29

One preliminary point needs to be addressed up front. Justice Kennedy's
decision did not allow for any type of restriction or limitation on the newly
created right to same-sex marriage. 30
The final sentence of the section of Justice Kennedy's opinion that was
devoted to answering the first question posed in the case (whether a state is
required to issue a marriage license to same-sex couples under the 14th
Amendment) contained the only hint at a limitation on the right to same-sex
marriage: "The Constitution, however, does not permit the State to bar same-sex
couples from marriage on the same terms as accorded to couples of the opposite
sex." 3 1 As a matter of guidance, this conclusory statement is of no value since
Justice Kennedy previously proclaimed that a state could not abridge a
fundamental right.
Furthermore, same-sex couples were not barred from
traditional marriage-they were free to marry members of the opposite sex under
pre-existing and traditional definitions of marriage.
This may seem to be a trite manipulation of Justice Kennedy's statement,
but since neither he nor his fellow concurring justices bothered to flesh out the

29. Brief of Tri Valley Law in support of Respondents, Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 1039 (2015),
(Nos. 14-556, 14-562, 14-571 and 14-574), at 15-16 (April 2, 2015). (citing Brief of Scholars of the
Constitutional Rights of Children in support of Petitioners, Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 1039 (2015, (Nos.
14-556, 14-562, 14-571 & 14-574) (Mar. 5, 2015) (alteration to original) (citation omitted). Justice Kennedy
responded to the question I posed in the last sentence of this passage from my amicus brief, stating, that while
the interests of children and family were one of four rationales for finding a fundamental right to same-sex
marriage, it would be wrong to use the rationale as a condition for exercising the new right. In other words,
Justice Kennedy refuses to limit the exercise of fundamental rights to the core meanings of the right.
Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2601 ("That is not to say the right to marry is less meaningful for those who do not or
cannot have children. An ability, desire, or promise to procreate is not and has not been a prerequisite for a
valid marriage in any State. In light of precedent protecting the right of a married couple not to procreate, it
cannot be said the Court or the States have conditioned the right to marry on the capacity or commitment to
procreate. The constitutional marriage right has many aspects, of which childbearing is only one."). This
should be taken as guidance for Second Amendment cases, demonstrating that the right to keep and bear arms
has "many aspects", all of which must be absolutely protected from abridgement.

30. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2608.
31. Id. at 2607.
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contours of a state's residual right to regulate the unique nature of same-sex
marriage, or any other fundamental right, we have to rely on the rest of his
opinion for guidance. The rest of the opinion dismantles federalism and the
states' traditional role as the sole authority in regulating marriage and further
states that there is an absolute prohibition on any state from abridging
fundamental rights, including the new right to same-sex marriage. This is
incompatible with Justice Kennedy's dicta, above. It is also incompatible with
the effect of the first post-decision challenge to the Court's Obergefell ruling. In
response to Obergefell, a county clerk in Kentucky chose to suspend the issuance
of all marriage licenses, without regard to the makeup of the parties seeking the
license. After same-sex and opposite-sex couples in that county filed suit,
alleging a violation of 14" Amendment rights, 32 both the district court and the
Sixth Circuit enjoined the county clerk from implementing the policy of issuing
no marriage licenses, finding that under, inter alia, Obergefell, the fundamental
right to marriage could not be infringed. The Supreme Court denied the clerk's
application for a stay on August 31, 2015. What we have to take from this is that
states no longer have any discretion in licensing marriage, and, contrary to
Justice Kennedy's statement in Obergefell, the Court's opinion memorialized
this federal usurpation of traditional state power. 33
Justice Kennedy's pronouncement was an absolute diktat to the states,
ordering them to license same-sex marriages without qualification. Justice
Kennedy removed all discretion from the states, the traditional arbiter of
marriage licensing matters, lest they infringe upon the unenumerated dignity
rights purportedly protected by the 14h Amendment. As Justice Kennedy
proclaimed, the democratic process embedded in federalism may not "abridge
fundamental rights." 34
The only way to understand this in plain English is through the following
summary of Justice Kennedy's new 14' Amendment calculus: A fundamental
right may not be infringed in any manner or to any extent by state or local
regulation. Justice Kennedy's new approach to the protection of fundamental
rights from government interference appears to establish a level of review in
excess of strict scrutiny, something closer to absolute compliance.
A. What are FundamentalRights?
In his majority opinion, Justice Kennedy chronicles some of the theretoforeidentified fundamental rights (liberty and rights being used interchangeably in
Justice Kennedy's opinion). On the one hand, Justice Kennedy properly
identifies "most of the rights enumerated in the Bill of Rights" as being
fundamental rights. 3 5 He also notes that there are litanies of unenumerated
fundamental rights. Of particular importance for the purpose of this paper,
32. Miller v. Davis, No. 0:15-cv-00044, at *3 (E.D. Ky, Aug 12, 2015).
33. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2618-19 (2015) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) ("The majority
acknowledges none of this doctrinal background, and it is easy to see why: Its aggressive application of
substantive due process breaks sharply with decades of precedent and returns the Court to the unprincipled
approach of Lochner.").

34. Id. at 2605.
35. Id. at 2597.
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though, is the Second Amendment's protection of the right to keep and bear
arms, and whether it is one of the rights enumerated in the Bill of Rights that is
considered to be a fundamental right.
In short, the answer is an unequivocal yes.
In 2010, the Court heard a challenge to a municipal law that restricted
firearms ownership in the City of Chicago.3 6 Chicago argued that while the
2008 Heller decision may have found that there was an individual right to keep
and bear arms under the Second Amendment, that right only protected
individuals from federal laws. 37 The Court struck down Chicago's firearms ban,
declaring that the Second Amendment was incorporated against the states under
the Fourteenth Amendment. 38
To put a point on the issue, the Court unambiguously found that "it is clear
that the Framers and ratifiers of the Fourteenth Amendment counted the right to
keep and bear arms among those fundamental rights necessary to our system of
ordered liberty." 39 Not only is the right protected by the Second Amendment a
fundamental right, it is, as the Heller Court pronounced and the McDonald
Court reminded us, a fundamental right that is not "subject to 'interest
balancing."' 4 0 That is, the rights protected by the Second Amendment can't be
eroded by legislatures or courts that seek to balance the right, on the one hand,
against purported state interests that could be furthered by imposing limitations
on that right, on the other hand. 4 1
Though the Heller Court noted in dicta certain existing regulations on the
right to keep and bear arms, such as limitations on the right for felons or the
mentally ill, those words remain dicta. 42 The question presented in Heller was

36. McDonald v. Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 748 (2010).
37. Id. at 750 ("Chicago and Oak Park argue that their laws are constitutional because the Second
Amendment has no application to the States.").
38. Id. at 791 ("We therefore hold that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
incorporates the Second Amendment right recognized in Heller.").

39. Id. at 778.
40. Id. at 785.
41. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 634-635 (2008) ("We know of no other
enumerated constitutional right whose core protection has been subjected to a freestanding "interest-balancing"
approach. The very enumeration of the right takes out of the hands of government-even the Third Branch of
Government the power to decide on a case-by-case basis whether the right is really worth insisting upon. A
constitutional guarantee subject to future judges' assessments of its usefulness is no constitutional guarantee at
all. Constitutional rights are enshrined with the scope they were understood to have when the people adopted
them, whether or not future legislatures or (yes) even future judges think that scope too broad. We would not
apply an "interest-balancing" approach to the prohibition of a peaceful neo-Nazi march through Skokie. See
National Socialist Party of America v. Skokie, 432 U.S. 43 (1977) (per curiam). The First Amendment
contains the freedom-of-speech guarantee that the people ratified, which included exceptions for obscenity,
libel, and disclosure of state secrets, but not for the expression of extremely unpopular and wrong-headed
views. The Second Amendment is no different. Like the First, it is the very product of an interest-balancing by
the people . . . .")
42. Heller, 554 U.S. at 627. Since Heller, the Supreme Court has not upheld any laws that expand
existing limitations on Second Amendment rights and, in fact, in late 2015, Justices Thomas and Scalia urged
the Court to grant certiorari to provide the Court with an opportunity to re-assert the unconstitutionality of state
and local bans on classes of weapons, including so-called "assault weapons." Friedman v. City of Highland

Park, II., 784 F.3d 406 ( 7 th Cir. 2015), cert denied, 136 S. Ct. 447, 449 (2015) ("The question under Heller is
not whether citizens have adequate alternatives available for self-defense. Rather, Heller asks whether the law
bans types of firearms commonly used for a lawful purpose-regardless of whether alternatives exist.")).
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whether the Second Amendment protected individual rights to keep and bear
arms, and the answer was that such a right was protected. And McDonald
further enshrined the right as being fundamental for purposes of the 14'
Amendment.
B. What did the Majority Opinion Really Say in Obergefell?

As noted infra, and as criticized by the dissent, Justice Kennedy's majority
opinion in Obergefell was bereft of a discussion of applicable precedent or, for
that matter, any semblance of legal reasoning. Justice Kennedy was generous
with his discussion of the history of traditional marriage and its status as a
fundamental right, but he utterly failed to explain how same-sex marriage, an
institution with virtually no history in the United States or elsewhere and one
that was demonstrably different from opposite-sex marriage under existing law,
deserved the legal status of a fundamental right.
In Obergefell's lower court proceedings, the Sixth Circuit noted the import
of this point. As the Sixth Circuit studiously explained, "[t]he upshot of
fundamental-rights status, keep in mind, is strict-scrutiny status, subjecting all
state eligibility rules for marriage to rigorous, usually unforgiving, review." 4 3

What Justice Kennedy had to do to prove that same-sex marriage was a
fundamental right was not to simply say that it was subsumed within traditional
(i.e., opposite-sex) marriage. This it clearly was not, at least in a supermajority
of states before Obergefell. Rather, Justice Kennedy needed to show that samesex marriage is a right that is "deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition
[and] implicit in the concept of ordered liberty [such that] neither liberty nor
justice would exist if they were sacrificed." 4 4 Because there was no way for
Kennedy to contort the non-existent history of same-sex marriage into satisfying
this test, he simply disregarded the traditional test and concluded that liberty
required the recognition of this new type of union calling itself marriage, even if
such recognition required the Court to fundamentally transform existing
precedent.
Chief Justice Roberts called out Justice Kennedy's abandonment of
precedent on fundamental rights jurisprudence, explaining that:
recognizing how little support it can derive from precedent, the
majority goes out of its way to jettison the "careful" approach to
implied fundamental rights taken by this Court in Glucksberg. It
is revealing that the majority's position requires it to effectively
overrule Glucksberg, the leading modem case setting the bounds
of substantive due process. At least this part of the majority
opinion has the virtue of candor. Nobody could rightly accuse
the majority of taking a careful approach. 45

43. DeBoer v. Snyder, 772 F.3d 388, 412 (6th Cir. 2014) (emphasis added).
44. Id. (citing Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997)).
45. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2620 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (internal citations omitted).
See also, Justice Alito's dissent for another take on the conclusory reasoning employed by the majority. Id. at
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Chief Justice Roberts concluded that the only scrap of precedent the
majority found for its decision was in Lochner v. New York,4 6 a case dealing
with the right of an employee to choose how many hours in a week he would
work, where the Court found a promise of "individual autonomy."
Looking at the substance of Justice Kennedy's opinion, we find the core
logic behind the majority's determination that foundational principles such as
federalism give way to the "better-informed" determinations of the unelected
judiciary:
Of course, the Constitution contemplates that democracy is the
appropriate process for change, so long as that process does not
abridge fundamental rights. Last [t]erm, a plurality of this Court
reaffirmed the importance of the democratic principle in
Schuette v. BAMN, 134 S. Ct. 1623 (2014), noting the "right of
citizens to debate so they can learn and decide and then, through
the political process, act in concert to try to shape the course of
their own times." Id. at 1636. Indeed, it is most often through
democracy that liberty is preserved and protected in our lives.
But as Schuette also said, "[t]he freedom secured by the
Constitution consists, in one of its essential dimensions, of the
right of the individual not to be injured by the unlawful exercise
of governmental power." Id. Thus, when the rights of persons
are violated, "the Constitution requires redress by the courts,"
notwithstanding the more general value of democratic
decisionmaking. Id. at 1637.
This holds true even when
protecting individual rights affects issues of the utmost
47
importance and sensitivity.
One has to assume that when the majority speaks of democracy, it is
speaking of both the direct democracy represented by voter initiatives and
referenda, on the one hand, and the indirect democracy of voters electing state
and local representatives, who then act on the behalf of the citizens of a state to
enact laws, on the other hand.
What the Obergefell majority did, in effect, was to amend the Fourteenth
Amendment and abandon core Fourteenth-Amendment precedent.
Before
Obergefell, fundamental rights had to have one of two specific origins--either as
an explicitly enumerated right in the Bill of Rights or, as Glucksberg set out, as
an implied right so ingrained in our history as to be inseparable from ordered
liberty that all people expect when they agree to form a civil society. 48 Now,

2640 (Alito, J., dissenting) ("For today's majority, it does not matter that the right to same-sex marriage lacks
deep roots or even that it is contrary to long-established tradition. The Justices in the majority claim the
authority to confer constitutional protection upon that right simply because they believe that it is
fundamental.").

46. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 52 (1905).
47. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2605 (citing Schuette v. Coal. To Defend Affirmative Action, 134 S. Ct.
1623 (2014)) (alteration to original).
48. DeBoer, 772 F. 3d. at 410-11.
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according to Justice Kennedy, a right can be fundamental even if it is neither
enumerated in the Bill of Rights nor implied from our historical traditions.
Rather, fundamental rights are whatever a majority of the Court, acting in an
extra-constitutional role as the prognosticator of social mores, decides they are.
Of course, there's no authority for the Court to amend the Constitution
under any situation or for any reason. The Constitution, in Article V, establishes
the allowable procedures for Constitutional amendments. 49 The power to amend
the Constitution rests exclusively with Congress, the states and the people, not
the federal judiciary. 50 Not only is the Obergefell majority's action without
legal authority, as a matter of precedent, it will become the Fourteenth
Amendment's analog to Wickard v. Filburn,5 1 the infamous Commerce Clause
case that ushered in a massive expansion of government power in an area that the
Constitution never intended for the federal government to act.
As an example of the extreme upheaval that will result from Justice
Kennedy's Obergefell opinion, consider the following hypothetical. In response
to Obergefell, in compliance with Article V of the Constitution, the requisite
number of states adopts a new amendment to the Constitution. This TwentyEighth Amendment is drafted to re-establish the traditional definition of
marriage. It does not repeal the Fourteenth Amendment, so the principles that
the Obergefell Court relied upon remain intact.
In effect, though, this hypothetical Twenty-Eighth Amendment overturns
that aspect of Obergefell that required states to issue same-sex marriage licenses.
Yet in Obergefell, the majority held that where a democratic process undermines
an element of liberty that the "better-informed" judgment of the Court finds to be
necessary for the dignity of people, that process is invalid under the Fourteenth
Amendment and the laws that result from it cannot be enforced. As a result,
Obergefell compels future courts to not enforce the hypothetical Twenty-Eighth
Amendment, an amendment bome of democratic processes that nonetheless
infringes the fundamental right to same-sex marriage that Justice Kennedy said
was, by virtue of being recognized by the better-informed judgment of the
Judiciary, immune from abridgement by the people. If the Court can ignore
precedent and constitutional limitations to undermine the foundational principle
of federalism by striking down duly adopted state laws on marriage, why could it
also not do the same to undermine a constitutional amendment that it finds to
violate its newfound fundamental right to dignity?
Some will say, in response to this hypothetical, that institutional limits on
the Court's power would prevent the Court from invalidating a constitutional
49. U.S. CONST. art. V.
50. Id.
51. Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 113 (1942).

Wickard is a World War II-era decision on the

power of Congress to regulate a farmer's activities in growing crops for his own consumption. The Wickard
court found that even crops grown for a farmer's own consumption could be regulated as part of Congress'
power to regulate interstate commerce, as the farmer's actions removed him from the national market for the
crop and thus removed him from the demand component of the national economy, which had an effect on
interstate commerce.
Wickard dramatically expanded the powers of Congress to act in excess of any
enumerated Constitutional power, based on a reading of the Commerce Clause that was as tortured and baseless
as Justice Kennedy's reading of the 14th Amendment in Obergefell. In other words, it also was an exercise of
will, not legal judgment.
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amendment. As Chief Justice Roberts explained in Obergefell, "this Court is not
a legislature . . . . Under the Constitution, judges have power to say what the law
is, not what it should be." 5 2 If the institutional limits on the Court failed in
Obergefell, they will fail in future cases as well, including a case resembling the
hypothetical.
Reduced to its essence, then, under Obergefell, state or local laws that
infringe fundamental rights in any manner, especially fundamental individual
rights, cannot hide behind principles of federalism that, until Obergefell, allowed
states to be laboratories to experiment with ways to bring about social change. 53
In a post-Obergefell world, there are no exceptions or limitations on this new
level of protection against state regulations that abridge rights.
IV.

AFTER OBERGEFELL, CAN STATES ABRIDGE RIGHTS PROTECTED BY THE
SECOND AMENDMENT?

In Heller, the Court held that the individual rights protected by the Second
Amendment may not be infringed by state or local regulations, even if the
regulations were designed to engage in interest balancing. 5 4 At the time Heller
was decided, this may have been best understood as guidance for future courts as
to the level of review that may be employed in the context of state regulations on
the right to keep and bear arms. Under Obergefell, however, the ability of states
to regulate fundamental rights, including Second Amendment rights, has been
dramatically narrowed. As Justice Kennedy's Obergefell opinion stated, the
democratic process that plays out in the states through initiatives and legislation
cannot "abridge fundamental rights," and as he implied in allowing for no
exceptions to this rule, the level of review that any government regulation of
fundamental rights would have to survive is now absolute compliance (that is,
any abridgement would be impermissible).55
Most troubling, from the perspective of federalism, there were no limits
placed on Kennedy's rule that democratic processes could not abridge
fundamental rights. He did not say that this rule only applied in the context of
marriage rights, or homosexual rights, or any other set of facts or circumstances.
It is an exceedingly broad rule, one that steamrolls existing precedent, including
that aspect of Windsor that is based on a respect for federalism, to eviscerate all
powers of states to independently promulgate restrictive regulations in the arena
of fundamental rights.
There is no question that the rights protected by the Second Amendment are
fundamental rights. The only way to understand Heller and McDonald through
the prism of Obergefell is that any state or local regulation that negatively
impacts the right to keep and bear arms, even if those regulations are
52. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2611 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). With all due humility, it does appear that
the Chief Justice borrowed the language in the second part of this quote, nearly verbatim, from my amicus
brief. See Brief of Tri Valley Law, supra note 29, at note 3 ("[tlhe difference between saying what the law is,
and saying what the law should be, is one that amicus Bay Area Lawyers For Individual Freedom want this
Court to ignore. It is the exclusive duty of the Legislative branch to say what the law should be.").

53. See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (J., Brandeis, dissenting).
54. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 634 (2008).
55. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2605.
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longstanding and directed at less-frequently seen expressions of the right (as was
the limitation on the issuance of marriage licenses to opposite-sex couples only
in Obergefell), violates 14th Amendment Equal Protection and Due Process
rights. This must be especially true of any state or local regulation that is more
restrictive than regulations promulgated by other states or the federal
government, as allowing more restrictive laws in one jurisdiction would
constitute the type of geographic discrimination that was found to be
unconstitutional in Obergefell.5 6
If this sounds a lot like the "occupy-the-field" analysis involved in
discerning instances of federal preemption, 57 it is because that is exactly what
Justice Kennedy mandated with regard to state and local laws that affect
fundamental rights. As opposed to federal preemption, which is indicated by
Congress' actions in signaling that it intends to be the sole source of authority,
this newly created form of judicial preemption exists whenever a state or locality
attempts to regulate a fundamental right in a manner that abridges any exercise
of that right.
In fact, when it comes to the interplay of state and federal law on a
particular fundamental right, the best reading of Obergefell (as it relates to the
Second Amendment) is that if a state regulation is more restrictive than any
federal regulation on the right to keep and bear arms, it is unconstitutional. As a
corollary to this, if the federal government has not promulgated regulations on a
specific aspect of the right to keep and bear arms, any state regulation would a
fortiori be an abridgement of the fundamental right enshrined in the Second
Amendment.
Consequently, since there is no federal law on any number of aspects of the
rights protected of the Second Amendment, such as magazine capacity,
concealed carry of firearms or possession of categories of weapons often (and
incorrectly) referred to as "assault weapons," any state or local regulations that
infringe those rights must be violations of the Fourteenth Amendment.
While Heller confirmed that the Second Amendment protects the right of
individuals to keep and bear arms, some state and local regulators have
attempted to narrow the right, arguing that there is a "core" Second Amendment
right that is protected but also an expansive non-core element to the right that
can be regulated with relative impunity, under a rational-basis or intermediatescrutiny standard.5 8 This clearly flies in the face of the explicit language of
Heller that forbade the infringement of the Second-Amendment right as part of
state or local interest balancing.
A. An Example ofNow-Impermissible Local Abridgement ofFundamental
Rights: Fyock v. City of Sunnyvale under Obergefell
By way of example, consider the case of local regulation of ammunition

56. Id. at 2606 ("Indeed, faced with a disagreement among the Courts of Appeals-a disagreement that
caused impermissible geographic variation in the meaning of federal law-the Court granted review to
determine whether same-sex couples may exercise the right to marry.").

57. See, e.g., Altria Group v. Good, 555 U.S. 70, 76 (2008).
58. See, e.g., Fyock v. City of Sunnyvale, 25 F. Supp. 1267, 1274 (N.D. Cal. 2014).
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magazines. In 2013, the people of the City of Sunnyvale, California voted to
approve, and the city enacted, a law that prohibited the possession of firearms
magazines capable of holding in excess of ten rounds of ammunition. 59 The law
was challenged as an infringement of the rights protected by the Second
Amendment, and in a 2015 decision, the Ninth Circuit upheld a denial of a
preliminary injunction against the law. 60 The Ninth Circuit deferred to the lower
court's use of an interest-balancing approach to examining the local magazine
ban, asserting that "large-capacity" magazines, which the lower court
acknowledged were "arms" under the Second Amendment, were not part of the
core right protected by the Second Amendment, and the local regulation was a
permissible means of enhancing public safety. 6 1
Notwithstanding the fact that the lower court's interpretation of Heller was
utterly at odds with what the Supreme Court said in Heller,62 Obergefell would
now require the Ninth Circuit to reach a different result, granting the preliminary
injunction against the local ban on magazines.
This is because under Heller and McDonald, the right to keep and bear
arms is a fundamental right, and there is no federal law that prohibits the
possession of so-called "large capacity magazines." In fact, a federal law that
banned so-called "assault weapons" and "large capacity magazines" lapsed by its
terms in 2004, and no subsequent ban was enacted. 63 The fact that Congress
chose not to renew the prior ban, and that any new ban would likely not survive
a review under Heller, demonstrates that the fundamental right to keep and bear

arms, including "large-capacity magazines" and "assault weapons," is one that
cannot be infringed by any state or local regulation. This is so because pursuant
to Obergefell, any "geographic variation" of laws affecting fundamental rights
cannot be tolerated and any democratic process that infringes a fundamental

59. See also MARC GREENDORFER, AND THE BAN PLAYED ONE: THE "PUBLIC SAFETY" THREAT TO

INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS 4 (2014) (providing a detailed analysis of Fyock and other state / local attempts to infringe
on fundamental, individual rights based on an interest balancing "public safety" rational.). This book is also
available for download as a scholarly paper, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=24
26704.
60. Fyock v. City of Sunnyvale, 779 F. 3d 991, 994 (9th Cir. 2015).
61. Id.
62. The Heller Court did not establish any distinction between "core" elements of the Second
Amendment right versus non-core elements, let alone allow for the infringement of non-core elements. Heller
also expressly disallowed any form of interest balancing tests for Second Amendment rights, which is exactly
what the Fyock court engaged in by reviewing the local regulation under intermediate scrutiny. The only thing
Heller allowed in terms of regulation was to provide that under then-existing precedent, under principles of
federalism, some long-standing regulations of the right to keep and bear arms, such as laws that prohibited
felons from possessing firearms or laws that prohibited the possession of firearms that were not traditionally
used for legitimate purposes (e.g., military grade automatic weapons) or that had individually been altered to
make them dangerous, could be upheld. When a firearm is possessed for its traditional and legitimate use
under the Second Amendment, whether it is sporting use, hunting, or self-defense, Heller does not allow the
government to enact bans on classes or types of firearms, or parts used in those firearms. See Marc
Greendorfer, People v. Zondorak: California's Attack on the Second Amendment,

17 CHAPMAN L. REV.

ONLINE 1, 2-3 (2014) (demonstrating that under United States v. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 85, 97 (3d Cir. 2010),
any ban on classes of arms (or their components) is unconstitutional under Heller).
63. A federal ban on so-called "assault weapons" and "high capacity magazines" was enacted in 1994
as P.L. 103-322, Title XI (1994). The ban had a 10 year sunset clause and since its expiration in 2004 no
similar ban has been enacted at the federal level. See generally, Chu, Vivian S., FederalAssault Weapons
Ban: Legal Issues, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE 7-5700, R42957 (Feb. 14, 2013).
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individual right cannot survive Fourteenth-Amendment scrutiny. 64 The lower
court in Fyock acknowledged that under Heller, ammunition magazines were
arms protected by the Second Amendment. 6 5 Therefore, a local magazine ban
constitutes both an impermissible geographic variation of law and a nowunconstitutional expression of federalism's process of local experiments that are
geared towards effecting social change.
It is interesting to note that in Fyock, the lower court relied upon testimony
that roughly forty-seven percent of handgun magazines in circulation had a
capacity in excess of ten rounds of ammunition, and found that since this did not
represent a majority of handgun magazines, those magazines, while "arms"
under the Second Amendment, were not a core element of the rights protected by
the Second Amendment, and interest balancing regulations could thus be
employed. 66 If a court were to apply the same logic to marriage licensing, samesex marriage would not be subject to the same protections as traditional marriage
due to the fact that far less than fifty percent of all marriage licenses are issued to
same-sex couples. 67
In point of fact, though, the Heller Court and McDonald also found that the
core right protected by the Second Amendment was not a right to own a limited
range of firearms. 6 8 Rather, the core right was individual ownership and use of
firearms for self-defense (as well as hunting and sporting purposes). 69 This is a
much broader right than lower courts have acknowledged in post-Heller
challenges to local regulations that infringe the Second Amendment. If the
Court ever takes up a challenge to such regulations, it will surely find that the
interest-balancing tests 70 and the focus on certain classes of arms 7 1 not being at
64. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2606 (2015).
65. Fyockv. City of Sunnyvale, 25 F. Supp. 1267, 1276-77 (N.D. Cal. 2014).
66. Id. at 1278.
67. Using Massachusetts as an example, where same-sex marriage has been legal since 2004, only
22,406 marriage licenses were issued to same-sex couples between 2004 and 2012. Drew Desilver, HowMany
Same-Sex Marriagesin the U.S.? At Least 71,165, Probably More, PEW RESEARCH CENTER (June 26, 2013),
http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2013/06/26/how-many-same-sex-marriages-in-the-u-s-at-least-71165probably-more/. Prior to the legalization of same-sex marriage in that state, approximately 36,000 traditional
marriages were licensed in an average year. See CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROl, Births, Divorces, and
Deaths: ProvisionalData for 2009, National Vital Statistics Report, vol. 58, no. 25 Table 2, at 7 (Aug. 27,
2010), http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nvsr/nvsr58/nvsr58_25.pdf.
Thus, in the eight year period in which
approximately 22,000 same-sex marriage licenses were issued, approximately 288,000 opposite sex marriage
licenses would have been issued, making same-sex marriage license rates approximately one-tenth that of
traditional marriage license rates. This is obviously far less than the fourty-seven percent threshold that the
Fyock court set for finding that a variation of a fundamental right fell outside of the bounds of its core
protections.

68. See Friedman v. City of Highland Park, Il., 784 F. 3d 406 (7 th Cir. 2015), cert denied, 136 S. Ct.
447, 449 (2015) (citing District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 592 (2008)) ("But that ignores Heller's
fundamental premise: The right to keep and bear arms is an independent, individual right. Its scope is defined
not by what the militia needs, but by what private citizens commonly possess.").

69. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 599 (2008) ("It is therefore entirely sensible that the
Second Amendment's prefatory clause announces the purpose for which the right was codified: to prevent
elimination of the militia. The prefatory clause does not suggest that preserving the militia was the only reason
Americans valued the ancient right; most undoubtedly thought it even more important for self-defense and
hunting.").
70. Id. at 634-35 ("We know of no other enumerated constitutional right whose core protection has been
subjected to a freestanding 'interest-balancing' approach. The very enumeration of the right takes out of the
hands of government-even the Third Branch of Government-the power to decide on a case-by-case basis
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the "core" of the Second Amendment, each of which was explicitly determined
to be violative of Second-Amendment rights in Heller,72 are as unconstitutional
as they are illogical.
A state (or any political subdivision of it) can no more ban the possession of
"large-capacity magazines" or refuse to recognize a permit issued in another
state allowing a person to carry a concealed firearm than it can refuse to issue a
marriage license to a same-sex couple or to recognize such a license issued by
another jurisdiction. Both the right to keep and bear arms and the right to samesex marriage are fundamental rights, immune to local regulations that limit those
rights. A fundamental right recognized in one state, be it marriage or self
defense, cannot be abridged by other states, and variations of such a right that
may not constitute the predominant means of exercising the right (be it same-sex
marriage as a subset of all marriage or "large-capacity magazines" as a subset of
all arms) must receive the same absolute protections as the all other means of
exercising the right.
All of this, though, is an aside, because once we had determined that a right
is fundamental (and McDonald conclusively affirms this in respect of the rights
under the Second Amendment, 7 3 which include, but are not limited to, the
possession and use of arms for self defense), Obergefell requires the Court to
strike down any state or local abridgement of that right.
If Obergefell stands for anything, it stands for two propositions: first, the
democratic process cannot narrow fundamental rights. Second, to the extent
there is "geographic variation" in the terms of a law affecting fundamental rights
whether the right is really worth insisting upon. A constitutional guarantee subject to future judges'
assessments of its usefulness is no constitutional guarantee at all. Constitutional rights are enshrined with the
scope they were understood to have when the people adopted them, whether or not future legislatures or (yes)
even future judges think that scope too broad. We would not apply an 'interest-balancing' approach to the
prohibition of a peaceful neo-Nazi march through Skokie (citing National Socialist Party of America v. Skokie,
432 U.S. 43, 97 (1977) (per curiam)). The First Amendment contains the freedom-of-speech guarantee that the
people ratified, which included exceptions for obscenity, libel, and disclosure of state secrets, but not for the
expression of extremely unpopular and wrong-headed views. The Second Amendment is no different. Like
the First, it is the very product of an interest-balancing by the people-which Justice Breyer would now
conduct for them anew. And whatever else it leaves to future evaluation, it surely elevates above all other
interests the right of law-abiding, responsible citizens to use arms in defense of hearth and home.").
71. Id. at 628 ("The handgun ban amounts to a prohibition of an entire class of 'arms' that is
overwhelmingly chosen by American society for that lawful purpose. The prohibition extends, moreover, to
the home, where the need for defense of self, family, and property is most acute. Under any of the standards of
scrutiny that we have applied to enumerated constitutional rights, banning from the home 'the most preferred
firearm in the nation to "keep" and use for protection of one's home and family,' would fail constitutional

muster.") (quoting Parker v. District of Columbia, 478 F.3d 370, 400 (2007)) (emphasis added).
This is a critical point, as it indicates that using arms (a term not limited to a specific type or configuration of
arm) for self defense is an irreducible right and the idea that a court could ban a class of weapon as a
prophylactic measure is as ludicrous and unsupportable as the idea that the government could engage in prior
restraint to protect a person from being libeled. Laws that criminalize misuse of arms are certainly sure to pass
constitutional muster, but the enforcement of those types of restrictions on the use of arms is predicated on the
condition that it is only an unlawful use that can be punished, rather than the entire lawful use infringed upon
en masse.
72. The Supreme Court has not revisited the issues raised in Heller since the McDonald decision, but
the dissenting opinion of Justices Scalia and Thomas in denial of the petition for certiorari in Friedman

strongly support this conclusion. Friedman v. City of Highland Park, II., 784 F. 3d 406 (7th Cir. 2015), cert
denied, 136 S. Ct. 447, 449 (2015).
73. McDonald v. Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 778 (2010).
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protected through the Fourteenth Amendment (including, presumably, under the
incorporation doctrine), such variation is constitutionally impermissible, and the
underlying circuit court rulings and the state and local regulations must yield to a
uniform federal law. 74

V.

THE END OF STATE AND LOCAL REGULATION OF SECOND AMENDMENT
RIGHTS

Consequently, all state or local firearms regulations that infringe on the
rights protected by the Second Amendment and exceed any level of existing and
constitutional federal regulation must be seen as violating Obergefell. Because
there is no federal ban on, for example, concealed carry of firearms or the
possession of "large-capacity magazines" or "assault weapons," unless and until
the Court hears a case that finds these three forms of expressing the right to keep
and bear arms are not protected by the Second Amendment, or until the
Constitution is amended explicitly to remove them from the rights protected by
the Second Amendment, any state or local prohibition on them would fail under
Obergefell.
This is in keeping with permissible arms regulations described by Justice
Scalia in Heller. In Heller, certain types of arms regulations were deemed not to
violate the Second Amendment. 7 5 The list of permissible regulations consisted
of existing laws relating to (i) firearms possession by felons and those suffering
from mental illness, (ii) firearms possession at government buildings or schools,
and (iii) conditions and qualifications for the commercial sale of arms. 76
Though a footnote purported to indicate that the list was not exhaustive, the
listing must be understood to provide general categories of permissible
regulation. Any type of regulation that is not within the general contours of the
three categories would have to be seen as violative of Heller.
The only other type of regulation limiting the right to keep or bear arms
permitted under Heller related to the rule set out in U.S. v. Miller,77 which was
clarified in Heller. Under Heller, Miller stands for the proposition that existing
federal law prohibiting the possession or sale of certain dangerous arms,
consisting of short barreled shotguns or arms that have been tampered with to
remove serial numbers, is compatible with the Second Amendment. 7 8
So we can see that the three types of regulations that were deemed
permissible under Heller, and the regulations under Miller that Heller found to
be permissible, share one key characteristic: they are all existing federal laws

74. Justice Kennedy's opinion explicitly provided for this when it set forth the reason the Court was
rendering a decision in this case. Pointing out that there was a split among courts of appeals on whether the
14th Amendment required states to license same-sex marriage, Justice Kennedy stated "Indeed, faced with a
disagreement among the Courts of Appeals-a disagreement that caused impermissible geographic variation in
the meaning of federal law-the Court granted review to determine whether same-sex couples may exercise the

right to marry." Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2706 (2015).
75. Heller, 554 U.S. at 626-27.
76. Id.
77. United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 178 (1939).
78. Id. at 182-83.
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that do not regulate entire classes or categories of arms. 79
So it becomes clear that there is an obvious synergy between the
permissible regulation that may be imposed on the right to keep and bear arms
under Heller (that is, existing federal regulation is the only type of regulation
that passes Constitutional muster) and the new conception of the sanctity of
Fourteenth-Amendment fundamental rights under Obergefell (state and local
regulations, even if enacted through the democratic process, may not abridge any
fundamental right, and they may not result in geographic variations in the
substance of the exercise of the right).
VI. CONCLUSION: STATE AND LOCAL LAWS ABRIDGING FUNDAMENTAL
RIGHTS, INCLUDING ALL REGULATION OF ARMS, ARE UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

After Obergefell, any state or local law that is more restrictive than existing
federal law on the rights protected by the Second Amendment would necessarily
violate Fourteenth-Amendment protections under Obergefell. For example, state
or local laws that ban the possession of classes of arms or types of arms
(including components of those arms, such as ammunition magazines) or that
limit the bearing of those arms (such as concealed-carry limitations) can be
upheld if the limitations are promulgated at the federal level and survive a level
of review at the Supreme Court that does not involve any interest balancing (i.e.,
strict compliance). A state ban on altering serial numbers on firearms or a state
ban on concealed carry in school zones could be upheld, since there are existing
federal laws with those specific prohibitions, but a state or local ban on
magazines holding more than ten rounds of ammunition or on classes of arms
such as "assault weapons," or a state or local restriction on concealed carry
generally, would be unconstitutional since those regulations are more restrictive
than any existing federal regulations. 80
It may be that the Court never expected that by stripping the states (and the
people) of their traditional role in regulating marriage, they would also be
stripping states and localities of their traditional powers to regulate all
fundamental rights, but such is the nature of breaching the institutional
protections that the framers of the Constitution developed to protect our rights.
The Obergefell Court spoke at length about the need to respect the dignity and
nobility of the individual, to the point that democratic processes embedded in
federalism had to be abandoned. One can think of no other expression of dignity
79. See 18 U.S.C. § 921-931 (2012); 26 U.S.C. § 5861.
80. This conclusion is supported by the dissenting opinion of Justices Thomas and Scalia in the denial

of certiorari in Friedman. Friedman v. City of Highland Park, Il., 784 F. 3d 406 (7th Cir. 2015), cert denied,
136 S. Ct. 447, 449 (2015). In Friedman, Justice Scalia, the author of the Heller opinion, joined with Justice
Thomas, who concurred in the Heller decision, to provide the most authoritative explanation to date regarding
the meaning of Heller with regard to Second Amendment protections for "assault weapons": "Heller draws a
distinction between [arms commonly used for lawful purposes, such as "assault weapons"] and weapons
specially adapted to unlawful uses and not in common use, such as sawed-off shotguns. The City's ban [on
assault weapons] is thus highly suspect because it broadly prohibits common semiautomatic firearms used for
lawful purposes. Roughly five million Americans own AR-style semiautomatic rifles. The overwhelming
majority of citizens who own and use such rifles do so for lawful purposes, including self-defense and target
shooting. Under our precedents, that is all that is needed for citizens to have a right under the Second
Amendment to keep such weapons." Id. at 449 (citations omitted).
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and nobility than the inherent, fundamental right to self defense. Any state or
locality that abridges this right, for example, by banning types of arms such as
large-capacity ammunition magazines or by refusing to recognize concealedcarry permits from other jurisdictions, necessarily insults the nobility and dignity
of individuals seeking the means to exercise the right to self defense. The
floodgates are now open to roll back all state and local regulations that abridge
Second Amendment rights in any manner.

